The common sense suggests that networks are not random mazes of purposeless connections, but that these connections are organised so that networks can perform their functions. One common function that many networks perform is targeted transport or navigation. Here with the help of game theory we show that minimalistic networks designed to maximise the navigation efficiency at minimal cost share basic structural properties of real networks. These idealistic networks are Nash equilibria of a network construction game whose purpose is to find an optimal trade-off between the network cost and navigability. They are navigation skeletons that we show are present in the Internet, E. coli metabolic network, English word network, US airport network, and the Hungarian road network. The knowledge of these skeletons allows one to identify the minimal number of edges by altering which one can dramatically improve or paralyse the navigation in the network.
Networks are efficient conduits of information and other media. News, ideas, opinions, rumours, and diseases spread through social networks fast, sometimes becoming viral for reasons that are often difficult to predict [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Many biological networks are also paradigmatic examples of information routing, ranging from information processing and transmission in the brain, to signalling in gene regulatory networks, metabolic networks, or protein interactions [13] [14] [15] [16] . Perhaps the most basic example is the Internet whose primary function is to route information between computers. If one is to list some common functions of different networks, then information routing will likely be close to the top. It is thus not surprising that many networks were found navigable, meaning that nodes can efficiently route information through the network even though its global structure is not known to any individual node [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] .
These findings do not necessarily mean that real networks evolve to become navigable. Navigability can be a by-product of some other evolutionary incentives because different networks have many other different functions as well. In other words, it remains unclear if ideal networks whose only purpose is to be maximally navigable at minimal costs have anything in common with real networks. Even if they do, then how close are real networks to these ideal maximally navigable configurations? If they are close but not exactly there, or if their navigability suddenly deteriorates, possibly signifying an onset of a disease [30] , then what can we do to cure the network and boost its navigability?
Here we show that the ideal maximally navigable networks do share some basic structural properties with the Internet, E.coli metabolic network, English word network, US airport network, and the Hungarian road network. We find that the probability that an edge from a maximally navigable idealisation exists the real network is high, exceeding 90% in certain cases. We also quantify exactly what connections the considered real networks lack to be maximally navigable, and which of their connections are not exactly necessary for that. To define and construct the maximally navigable network idealisations we employ game theory.
Game theory is a standard tool to study the behaviour of a population with given incentives. The population members are called players, and their possible actions are strategies, while cost functions or payoffs express players' incentives. The purpose of a player is to minimise her costs (or maximise her payoffs) by adjusting her strategy. A Nash equilibrium is a game state such that no player can further reduce her costs by altering her strategy unilaterally. Such equilibrium states are local optima where the game can eventually settle after some transient dynamics. The global optimum is an optimum where the total cost of all players is minimised. Since the inception of game theory a broad palette of games has been introduced, modelling diverse properties of real-life situations [31] , Fig. 1 .
Here we use game theory to find the structure of networks that are Nash equilibria of a network construction game [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] with navigability incentives. In our Network Navigation Game (NNG), players are network nodes whose optimal strategy is to set up a minimal number of edges to other nodes ensuring maximum navigability. That is, the cost function reflects trade-offs between the number of created edges and navigability. If each node connects to each other node, then this construction is maximally navigable but maximally expensive, too. If no edges are set up, then the cost is zero, but so is navigability. There is a sweet spot of the least expensive but still 100%navigable network. The goal of our game is to find this sweet spot. To measure navigability we use the standard efficiency metrics of geometric routing [38] . The geometry of numerous real networks is not Euclidean but hyperbolic [39] , which is a consequence of an interplay between popularity and similarity factors influencing network growth [40] . As a result of this interplay, nodes can be placed on the hyperbolic plane such that radial coordinates of nodes represent their popularity, angular distances between nodes reflect their similarity, while the overall distribution of nodes on the plane is close to uniform [40] . Therefore the starting point of our game is a set of nodes at random locations on the hyperbolic plane.
Results
Game definition. Players, hyperbolic plane, and geometric routing. We start with a set of players u = 1, 2, . . . , N , i.e., N nodes, scattered randomly over a hyperbolic disk of radius R. The densities of players' polar coordinates (r, φ), r ∈ [0, R], φ ∈ [0, 2π], are [39] 
where α > 1/2 is a parameter controlling the heterogeneity of the layout. If α = 1, the players are distributed uniformly over the hyperbolic disk because the area element at coordinates (r, φ) is dA = sinh(r) dr dφ. The desired player scattering is achieved in simulations by placing players u at polar coordinates r u = (1/α) acosh {1 + [cosh(αR) − 1] U } and φ u = 2πU where U for each u is a random number drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The hyperbolic distance between any two players u and v is
In greedy geometric routing, player u routes information to some remote player v by forwarding the information to its connected neighbour u closest to v in the plane according to the distance above. If u has no neighbour u closer to v than uself, then navigation fails, and we say that u cannot navigate to v. The percentage of pairs of players u, v such that u can successfully navigate to v is called the success ratio. If this percentage is 100%, we say that the network is maximally (100%) navigable.
Strategies. The strategy space of player u is all possible combinations of edges that u can establish to other players. One extremal strategy is to establish no edges. The other extreme is to connect to everyone. The total number of possibilities for u is 2 N −1 . Any combination of strategies that all players select is a network on N nodes.
Payoff. The objective of each player u is to set up a minimal number of edges to other players such that u can still navigate to any other player in the network. Formally, the cost function of player u that it minimises is c u = k u + n u , where k u is the number of edges that u establishes, and n u is either zero if u can navigate to everyone, or infinity otherwise. A more formal description of the strategies and payoffs can be found in Appendix 1. Nash equilibria of the game. Given any player u, we call player v's coverage area the set of all points closer to v than to u, Fig. 2 . Trivially v covers itself, since it is closer to itself (d(v, v) = 0) than to u. Therefore if u connects to all other players, then u trivially covers them all. The optimal strategy for u minimising u's costs is thus to connect to a minimal number of players such that the union of their coverage areas contains all the other players. Indeed, if u does that, and if all other players do the same, then the resulting network is 100%-navigable at minimal number of edges. The network is fully navigable because if u wants to navigate to any remote player w, then by construction there exists u's neighbour v that contains w in its coverage area, and u can use v as the next hop towards w. If v is not directly connected to w, then there exists v's neighbour v that contains w in its coverage area, so that v can route to v , and so on until the information reaches destination w lying within the intersection of all the coverage areas along the path, Fig. 2 . The problem of finding the optimal set of edges for u thus reduces to the minimum set cover problem [41] . A formal description of the equilibrium network and a detailed example (for simplicity in the Euclidean plane) can be found in Appendix 2.
The Nash equilibrium of this game is not necessarily unique. There can exist different networks minimising the cost above. However there exist certain edges, which we call frame edges, necessarily present in any Nash equilibrium. Edge u → v is a frame edge if u is the closest player to v. In this case u cannot navigate to v through any other players since there is no one closer to v than uself, so that u must connect directly to v to reach it, Fig. 2 . If at least one of such edges is absent, the network is not fully navigable. The exact definition of the "frame topology" consisting the frame edges can be found in Appendix 3.
In any Nash equilibrium of this game, each player computes its optimal strategy independently of others. In game theory such equilibria are called dominant strategy equilibria. Moreover the equilibrium is also a social optimum since one cannot create a fully navigable network using less edges. Structural properties of Nash-equilibrium networks.
Using the trigonometry of overlapping hyperbolic disks, we show in Appendix 4 that if the node density is uniform (α = 1), then the probability p(d) that two players u and v located at distance d ≡ d(u, v) are connected in a Nash equilibrium network lies between exp(−8 δ e d/2 ) and exp(−2 δ e d/2 ),
where δ is the average density of players on the disk, that is δ = N/A, where A is the disk area. The expected degree of player u at polar coordinates (r u , 0)-we can assume that u's angular coordinate is φ u = 0 without loss of generality-is thenk(
and ρ(φ v ) are the player densities from Eq. (1). We can evaluate this integral to find that the expected numberk(r) of connections of a player at radial coordinate r is bounded by Figure 2 : Navigability game illustrated. The first panel shows the optimal set of connections (optimal strategy) of node A in a small simulated network. All nodes are distributed uniformly at random over the hyperbolic disk, and A's optimal strategy is to connect to the smallest number of nodes ensuring maximum (100%) navigability. These nodes are B, C, and D because it is the smallest set of nodes whose coverage areas, shown by the coloured shapes, contain all other nodes in the network. B's coverage area for A (red) is defined as a set of points hyperbolically closer to B than to A, therefore if A is to navigate to any point in this area, A can select B as the next hop, and the message will eventually reach its destination, as the second panel illustrates. Link AC (and AD) in the first panel is also a frame link, because A is the closest node to C, as illustrated by the hyperbolic disk of radius |AC| centred at C (the line-filled shape), which does not contain any nodes other than C and A. Therefore to navigate to C, A has no choice other than to connect directly to C. The second panel shows the sequence of shrinking coverage areas along the navigation path (blue arrows) from D to E. The red curve is the geodesic between D and E in the hyperbolic plane. The coverage areas are shown by the shapes filled with lines of increasing density. The largest is A's coverage for D. The next one is B's coverage for A. The smallest is E's coverage for B. where r ≡ r u . It then follows that the average degree of players in the network, given byk = R 0k (r)ρ(r) dr, lies between 1 and 4, 1 ≤k ≤ 4.
We also see from Eq. (4) that the degree of players decays exponentially as the function of their radial position,k(r) ∼ e −r/2 , while their density exponentially increases, ρ(r) ∼ e r , Eq. (1). The combination of these two exponentials yields the power-law degree distribution in the network [42, 43] 
We also show analytically in Appendix 9 that the average clusteringc(k) of players of degree k decays with k as 1/k, while the average clusteringc = k P (k)c(k) in the network is around 0.45, also confirmed in simulations. Clustering does not depend on network size or average degree, meaning that clustering is a positive constant even in the large graph size limit. Remarkably, neither degree distribution nor clustering depend on the player density δ.
For non-uniform node density α = 1, we can analytically obtain only the lower bound fork(r, α), which is still proportional e − r 2 , i.e., independent of α if α > 1/2, Appendix 7. This lower bound suggests that the degree distribution is a power law P (k) ∼ k −γ with exponent γ = 2α + 1, which we confirm in simulations in Appendix 7. Figure 3 shows that the closer the γ to 2, the stronger the clustering, the cheaper the network, and the more efficient and robust the navigability. The value of γ = 2 thus appears as the "best choice" for a network-the network is maximally navigable at the lowest cost. Figure 4 confirms our analytic results and shows that some basic structural properties of NNGsimulated networks are similar to some real networks. Our results also suggest that the incentive for navigability alone may be sufficient to explain the properties of complex networks to a certain degree. Yet we cannot really make this claim based only on such large-scale statistical similarities. : Nash equilibrium networks in the Network Navigation Game share some basic structural properties with real networks. The real networks considered are the Internet, metabolic reactions, and the English word network, see Methods. The average distance and diameter are the average and maximum hop lengths of the shortest paths in the network. The average degree in the NNGsimulated network is lower than in the real networks because the NNG generates navigable networks with minimum numbers of edges. In the NNG network, the disk radius is R = 21.2 and α = 0.5. There are no other parameters.
A more detailed link-by-link comparison between real and corresponding NNG networks is needed to understand how well the NNG reflects reality. Network Navigation Game versus real networks. Figure 5 shows the results of this analysis applied to these and other real networks. We cannot expect real networks to be identical to NNG networks because the latter are minimum-cost maximum-navigation idealisations, while each individual real network performs many other functions different from navigation. In particular, since real networks must be error-tolerant and robust with respect to different types of network damage, we expect the number of edges in real networks to be noticeably larger than in their minimalistic NNG counterparts-something we indeed observe in Fig. 5 . Yet if navigation efficiency does matter for real networks, then we should expect a majority of edges present in these NNG idealisations to be also present in the corresponding real networks. Figure 5 confirms these expectations as well. The NNG precision in predicting links in real networks, defined as the ratio of NNG true positive links to the total number of NNG links, exceeds 80% for most networks, while the precision in predicting frame links, crucial for navigation, exceeds 90% for some networks. Certainly, since the real networks have many more links than NNG networks, their navigability may not suffer much from missing a small percentage of NNG links, as confirmed by the success ratio results in the same figure.
Of particular interest to us here are spatially embedded real networks whose primary function is transport. We consider two examples: the Hungarian road network and the airport network of Figure 5 : Network Navigation Game (NNG) predicts well links in real networks. The first row visualises the Internet, metabolic, and word networks mapped to the hyperbolic plane as described in the Methods section. The hyperbolic coordinates of nodes are then supplied to the minimum set cover algorithm that finds a Nash equilibrium of the NNG for each network. The second row does the same for the US airport network. It also shows the NNG equilibrium network based on the geographic (versus hyperbolic) coordinates of US airports, and the NNG network for the Hungarian road network. The NNG networks have the same sets of nodes as the corresponding real networks, but the sets of edges are different. The false negative blue edges are present in the real networks but not in the NNG networks. The false positive green edges are present in the NNG networks but not in the real networks. The true positive red edges are present in both networks. The table quantifies the relevant statistics showing the total number of edges in the real networks R, and their NNG counterparts M , the number of true positives T , and precision defined as T /M . The precision statistics is also shown for the frame edges. 8
the United States. In the former the nodes are the cities, towns, and villages of Hungary, while in the the latter the nodes are US airports. Two nodes are linked if they are connected by a direct road or flight. We expect the NNG to be particularly accurate in predicting links in these networks using the standard geographic-instead of hyperbolic-coordinates of nodes. To see how accurate these expectations are, we find the NNG equilibrium networks based on the geographic coordinates of cities and airports, and compare these networks against the corresponding real networks. The results are in the second row of Fig. 5 . We observe that the NNG link prediction accuracy on the Hungarian road network is particularly high, reaching 89.48% for all the links and 94.40% for the frame links, meaning that almost all frame road links, crucial for efficient navigation, are present in Hungary. Practically this means that Hungarians have luxury to go on a road trip without a map since all the major roads required by geographic navigation are there (albeit the condition of some of those roads is not as luxurious). To put it simply, there are roads where people with a compass may think they should be.
For the US airport network however, the geographic results are poor. These poor results may be unexpected at first, but they have a simple explanation in that the geometry of the airport network is not really Euclidean, as the geometry of the nearly planar road network, but hyperbolic. Indeed, efficient paths in the airport network optimise not so much the geographic distance travelled, but the number of connecting flights. As a consequence, most paths go via hubs. As opposed to the road network, where the number of roads meeting at an intersection does not vary that much from one intersection to another, the presence of hubs in the airport network makes the network heterogeneous, i.e., node degrees vary widely. This heterogeneity effectively creates an additional dimension (the "popularity" dimension in [40] ). That is, in addition to their geographic location, airports also have another important characteristic-the size or degree. This extra dimension makes the network hyperbolic [39] . The NNG results for the hyperbolic map of the airport network in Fig. 5 are as good as for the other networks. How to cure or injure a network efficiently.
The knowledge of the NNG equilibrium of a given real network makes it possible to efficiently identify links that are most critical for navigation in the network. Since NNG equilibrium networks are maximally navigable networks composed of the smallest number of links, we expect that if we alter a real network by either adding or removing a relatively small number of links belonging to the NNG equilibrium of the network, then such network modifications may significantly affect network navigability. Figure 6 supports these expectations. In the figure, we take the considered real networks, and add to them certain numbers of links that are present in the NNG equilibria of the real networks, but not present in the networks themselves. About 1-2% of added edges, compared to the original numbers of edges in the networks, increase network navigability significantly, while the addition of 2-5% of edges makes all the networks 100%-navigable. Similarly, the targeted removal of a small portion (1-5%) of edges belonging both to the NNG equilibria of the networks, and to the network themselves, degrades network navigability by 10-30%.
Discussion
We emphasise that the considered Nash equilibrium networks are minimalistic idealisations, concerned only with maximising the efficiency of the navigation function at minimal cost (number of links). Reality differs from this ideal in many ways. First, real networks must be robust with respect to noise and random failures. This robustness requirement explains why the considered real networks have strictly more links that their Nash equilibria. Maximum navigability can obviously be achieved not only at the minimal cost, but also at a higher cost. Second, transport processes in real networks are also noisy, and can follow not only steepest descent path (greedy navigation), but also any downstream paths, still achieving 100% reachability. Yet the noisier the transport process, the less likely it stays to the shortest path, leading to higher stretch and longer travel times, thus degrading navigation efficiency in terms of these parameters. Third, navigability does not always have to be maximised as many specific networks perform many specific functions other than navigation. Our game-theoretic approach can be extended to accommodate some of these functions, such as error tolerance or policy compliance [44] . Finally, all real networks are dynamic and growing, while Nash equilibria correspond to static network configurations. However it has been recently shown [45] that in case of random geometric graphs -to which the considered Nash equilibrium networks effectively belong according to the results in Appendix 8 -one can map an equilibrium network model to an identical growing one. Notwithstanding these limitations we have shown that ideal networks designed to be maximally navigable at minimal cost share basic structural properties with real networks. In particular, the values of power-law exponent γ close to 2, observed in many real networks [46, 47] , appear as the best possible choice. In this case not only reachability is 100%, but also the network cost and stretch are minimised and navigability robustness is maximised, compared to other values of γ in Fig. 3 .
We note that the connection between the structure and function of networks is often studied in the logically reverse direction: structure→function. That is, first some data about the structure of real networks is obtained, and then questions concerning how optimal this structure is with respect to a given network function are investigated. This logic does provide some evidence that the network might have evolved optimising this function, but this evidence is quite indirect and unre-liable compared to the direct demonstration that functionally optimal networks have the structure observed in reality: function→structure. The common sense suggests that this causal direction must reflect reality more adequately since networks, either designed or naturally evolving, do not have a completely random structure but the structure (effectively) optimising some functions. Yet studying networks in this direction is much more challenging primarily because of difficulties in formalising the constraints that a given function imposes, and deriving the resulting optimal network structure. Here, with the help of game theory, we have done so for the navigation function that many real networks (implicitly) perform.
As one would logically expect, the function→structure approach provides a deeper insight into specific details of network's structural organisation that are critical for its functional efficiency. We have confirmed this expectation by demonstrating that our approach can identify links in real networks that are most critical for navigation. A targeted attack on these critical links degrades navigability rapidly, while if a real network is not 100%-navigable, our approach finds the minimal number of not-yet-existing links whose addition to the network boosts up its navigability to 100%. Therefore our approach can be used to identify real network links that should be protected most in a critical network infrastructure. On the other hand, this approach can also help network designers to prioritise possible link placement options, i.e., pairs of not directly connected nodes, that, if connected, would maximise navigability improvement.
Methods
The real network data. The Internet dataset representing the global Internet structure at the Autonomous System (AS) level is from [48] . The metabolic network is the post-processed network of metabolic reactions in E. coli from [40] , Snapshot S 1 there. The post-processing details can be found in [40] . The word network is the largest connected component of the network of adjacent words in Charles Darwin's "The Origin of Species" from [49] . The airport network was downloaded from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics http://transtats.bts.gov/ on November 5, 2011. The hyperbolic maps of real networks. The hyperbolic coordinates of ASes and metabolites are from [48] and [40] . The hyperbolic coordinates of words and airports are inferred using the HyperMap method [50] . The method emulates the historical growth of a given network by adding nodes one at a time, starting with the highest-degree node, and inferring the coordinates of each node as the ones that maximise the likelihood that the growing network snapshot is generated by the growing hyperbolic network model in [40] . The Nash equilibrium networks of NNGs. The hyperbolic (and also geographic, in the airport network case) coordinates are then supplied to the GNU Linear Programming Kit (GLPK) http://www.gnu.org/software/glpk/ used to find a solution to the corresponding minimum set cover problem. To yield acceptable running times of the solver, the Internet and word networks are reduced in size by extracting their high-degree cores of about 4500 nodes. The Hungarian road data is processes slightly differently. First the cities in Hungary are mapped to their geographic coordinates using the database in http://www.kemitenpet.hu/letoltes/tables.helyseg_hu. xls. Then these coordinates are used in the GLPK to find the NNG equilibrium. Each edge in this equilibrium network is then checked for existence in the real road network. To check that, the GoogleMaps API https://pypi.python.org/pypi/googlemaps/ is used to find the shortest path between the two cities connected by the edge. The edge is defined to also exist in the real road 11 network if this shortest path does not go via any other city.
Appendix 1 -Formal definition of the Network Navigation Game (NNG)
Strategies. The strategy space for a player u ∈ P is to create some set of arcs to other players in the network: S u = 2 P\{u} . Let s be a strategy vector: s = (s 0 , s 1 . . . s N −1 ) ∈ (S 0 , S 1 . . . S N −1 ) and G(s) be the graph defined by the strategy vector s as G(s) = N −1 i=0 (i × s i ). Payoff. The objective of the players is to minimise their cost which is calculated as:
where
Appendix 2 -NNG equilibrium
The Nash equilibria of the Network Navigation Game can be characterised for each player independently as follows: take a player u, and for all
The optimal strategy s opt u of u is the minimal set cover of V with the sets S u v , independently from the strategies of the other players. This means that s = (s opt 1 , s opt 2 . . . s opt N −1 ) is both a NE and a social optimum. The Nash equilibrium is not necessarily unique as there can exist different solutions of the above set cover problem. In our work we concentrate on a specific equilibrium, which besides being a solution, it also minimises the sum of edge the edge lengths all over the network. This is fully in line with the edge-locality principle of complex networks [3] [19] [51] which many times accounted for the high clustering coefficient. More formally, from the strategy vectors constituting a Nash equilibria s i and the corresponding graphs G(s i ) = N −1 i=0 (i × s i ) = (V, E i ) we seek for the one minimising j∈E i d(E i (j)).
An example
As an example, let us compute the Nash equilibrium topology for four points in the Euclidean plane A, B, C, D. Any node u out of these four needs to have a greedy next hop towards any other nodes (to avoid infinite cost), while having its number of edges minimised. Note that having a greedy next hop is sufficient since all the other nodes will have greedy next hops towards any other nodes for ensuring c u ≤ ∞. This will imply greedy paths between arbitrary pairs of nodes. Thus we can construct the graph from these minimal set coverings see Fig. 7 . This is a Nash equilibrium and a social optimum as there are no lower cost equilibria or state for this game.
Appendix 3 -Frame topology
Here we show that there exists a well defined "frame topology" G f rame with scale-free out-degree distribution which is present in every Nash equilibrium, or social optimum of the game (G f rame ⊂ G(s * )) and other possible games having navigation as an incentive (p s = 1). In other words the frame topology serves as a skeleton of any equilibrium topology emerging from navigational games.
We also show that in terms of degree distribution and average degree the frame topology produces lower bounds for the equilibrium topologies. The frame topology is defined as:
Practically, the arc (u, v) is contained in G f rame if and only if the d(u, v)-disk centred at v does not contain any player other than u (see Fig. 8 ). This means that u cannot reach v by greedy routing through any other players then v, and so it must create an arc towards v to avoid of having infinite cost. Note that the in-degree of each player in G f rame will be exactly one.
O v u T u,v Figure 8 : An edge in the G f rame
Appendix 4 -Connection probability
Here we cast the problem in statistical terms. We estimate the percentage of pairs of nodes located at a given distance that are connected in the NNG equilibrium. We call this percentage the effective connection probability. First the connection probability of the Frame Topology is derived. This connection probability is a lower bound for the connection probability in the NNG equilibrium network because the Frame Topology is contained in every NNG equilibrium network. A direct upper bound of the connection probability is also studied. Based on a statistically equivalent lower bound and the direct upper bound, a general formula for the connection probability is induced, in which the average degree of the network is implicitly encoded. This makes it possible to approximate the connection probability (and all other quantities defined by it) using the observed average degree in the NNG simulation.
Connection probability in the Frame Topology
As presented in Appendix 3 an arc (u, v) in the Frame Topology is established if and only if there are no other points (players) within the intersection of the v−centred disk with radius d(u, v), and the original disk with radius R. Let T uv (see Fig. 8 ) denote the area of the intersection of the R-disk and the d(u, v)-disk at origin v, and δ = N/T R be the density of the points (T R denotes the area of the R-disk). The probability of this event is
An approximation for T uv is as follows: T uv is apparently equals to 2π(cosh d uv −1)(≈ πe . In Fig. 9 two characteristic cases are depicted when there is real intersection of the d uv -disk and the R-disk. Let the polar coordinates of node v be (r v , φ v ), and of node u be (r u , φ u ). Let φ = |φ u −φ v |. The area T uv is the function of r u , r v , φ, and R, and can be calculated as the sum of the two circle sectors with angle 2α, radius d uv and angle 2β radius R, and minus the area of the two triangles with angles α, β, γ. That is
where the angles and d uv are given by the hyperbolic law of cosines, however, here the following simpler approximations are used (which are accurate enough when r u and d uv appear in exponents):
Applying (9) with neglecting the triangle areas, and using cosh(R) In summary:
This T uv approximations are illustrated in Fig. 10 The calculation of the expected degree of node u requires e −δTuv in the following double integration:
Because the joint expansion of the double integral with respect to r v and φ reveals that the dominant terms will be those in which
Using (10) It is easy to see that A is the intersection of two disks with radii R 1 and R 2 (the smaller circles on Fig. 11 ). We can approximate the area of this intersection by the union of two sectors having angles φ 1 ≈ 2e duv 2 −R 1 and φ 2 ≈ 2e duv 2 −R 2 (by using an approximation on the hyperbolic distance d uv ≈ 2R i + 2 ln φ i 2 ) of the R 1 and the R 2 disks respectively. Using this the area of A is given by:
which further simplifies to:
The probability that there is a node in A is:
where N denotes the number of nodes and T disk is the area of the R-disk. Trivially p(d) ≤ 1−p(∃w ∈ A) so:
By substituting T A we get the following upper bound for the connection probability:
A general formula for the connection probability
In the Frame Topology (by definition) every node has exactly one incoming link, hence, the total number of links are N . From this it immediately follows that the average out-degree of Frame Topology is 1. This will also confirmed by the results of the next note (Appendix 5), in which the conditional expected degree of a node u with radial coordinate r u is calculated and shown by un-conditioning that the average degree is 1. Regarding the direct upper bound of the connection probability, consider a network in which links are established by this upper bound probability. Also the analysis in the next note implies that the average degree of such a network is 4. Based on the upper (21) and lower (16) bounds and the corresponding average degrees 1 and 4, a general formula of the connection probability can be induced as
It will be shown in the next sections that a network formed by this connection probability has average degreek. This formula is important because if an empirical average degree (which happens to be 2.27) can be observed in experiments (simulations) resulting in equilibrium networks of NNG, then not only upper and lower bounds on the expected degree of a node u and degree distribution, but analytical approximations of them can also be given with this empirical mean. Fig. 12 illustrates the relation of the upper and lower bounds, and the approximation of the connection probability to that of simulated NNG. the effective connection probability formula is given by the following double integral
The expected node-degree of the equilibrium network of NNG is lower bounded by k out (r u , 1, R) (which coincides the expected node-degree of the Frame Topology) whilst k out (r u , 4, R) is the upper bound. An analytical approximation with the empirical meank = 2.27 can be given by k out (r u , 2.27, R) .
In what follows a formula is derived for k out (r u ,k, R) based on the integral above. Considering the first integral by φ and applying the approximation 2 e duv 2 ≈ e ru+rv 2 1 − cos φ 2 (24) we get that the integral can be approximated as
where x = 8 k δe ru+rv 2 and the last wave due to that I(0, x) − S(0, x) (difference of the BesselI and the modified Struve functions) quickly tends to 2 π x −1 as x increases [52] . Now the second integration by r v gives the expected degree approximation, that is
One can check that the average degree is indeedk with this expected node-degree:
We have numerically studied the accuracy of the approximations above. We have found that the exponential decay of the expected degree of nodes (k out (r u )) is a good approximation of the numerically evaluated expected degree function for a wide range of node density δ ∈ [10 −8 , 10 −2 ]. For example, consider a Frame Topology (k = 1) with R = 16.5, n = 10000. In this case δ = 2.17 · 10 −4 . Figure 13 shows how the expected degree decay is matching the exponential decay. We observe that while at smaller r u there are some approximation errors, for larger values of r u the match is very good. To quantify further, we note that 99.9% of points have r u > 10 (that is in case of uniformly distributed points on the R(=16.5)-disk, expectedly only about 10 points of the 10000 is inside the disk with radius 10). If we consider the relative errors of the matching one can reveal that for r u > 10 it is smaller than 0.15%, that is for 99.9% of points the expected degree approximation has smaller than 0.15% relative error. To increase the number of points to n = 30000 and n = 50000 (δ = 6.54 · 10 −4 , δ = 1.08 · 10 −3 ), the relative error is increasing, especially for smaller values of r u , but still for 99.9% of the points the relative error smaller than 0.25% and 1%, respectively. If we dramatically decrease the node-density, for example n = 500, the relative errors also increase (compared to the n = 10000 case), however, it still remains under 0.2% for 99.9% of the points.
Appendix 6 -Degree distribution
Let us recall that in case of uniform distribution of points on an R−disk of the hyperbolic plane, the density of the radial coordinates of the points is ρ(r) = sinh r cosh R − 1 (28) Note that the expected degree of node u is exponential in the radial coordinate r u as in [53] . Because of this and the fact that equilibrium network of NNG is also sparse [54] the degree distribution can be calculated in the same way as in [53] :
where g(k, k out (r u )) is the conditional distribution of the degree of a node with radial coordinate u, and it is Poissonian with mean k out (r u ) in case of sparse networks. It can also be shown that for larger k
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The direct derivation of the complement cumulant degree distribution from P (k) seems to be intangible, however, from its approximation it can be computed as
where the constant C is 1, and k ≥ 1 2k (in order to have distribution function), that is
It is interesting to show that this approximation can also be obtained as the exact ccdf of the conditional expected node degrees k out (r u ). This approximation can be computed as
where r u (k) is the inverse function of k out (r u ,k, R) w.r.t. r u , i.e.
Applying this one can obtain the same before as
Note that this yields the average degree equal tok as expected:
From this, an analytical approximation of the ccdf of the NNG equilibrium network isF (k, 2.27), its lower and upper bounds areF (k, 1),F (k, 4), respectively. In Fig. 14 We also note that the δ-independence of k out (r u ) andF (k) is approximate, but it holds with a high accuracy for δ ∈ [10 −8 , 10 −2 ], including the frame topology.
Appendix 7 -Expected out-degree distribution in a frame topology with quasi-uniform node density
The radial coordinate density in case of quasi-uniform node density is
while the angle density remains uniform ( 1 2π ) over the range [1, 2π] . Given a point pair (u, v), first we determine the probability p(r u , α) that the u → v link exists, then based on this the average out degree k(r u , α) of u is calculated, and finallyF (k, α) is also given.
Probability p(r u , α) is equal to the probability that none of the remaining N − 2 points fall in the intersection of the v-centred d uv circle and the R-disk. Let us denote by p 1 the probability that a point whose coordinates generated by randomly according to the densities above falls inside the intersection. Using p 1 the probability p(r u , α) can be calculated and approximated as
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The calculation of p 1 can be performed by using the node density function in the following way [53] 
In [53] a useful approximation is presented for quite similar integrals, based on which one can write
for 0.5 < α ≤ 1 . Now the expected out-degree of u can be written as
Using the approximation of p 1 and cosh(d/2) ≈ e ru+rv 2
Note, that x does not depend on r v , therefore the second integration by r v results
Note, that for α = 1 we get back the result for the uniform density case, (26) . Now the (approximation of the) complement cumulative distribution functionF (k) can be derived as,F
where r u (k) is the inverse function of k out (r u ) . The simulation results displayed in Figure 15 readily confirm this finding. Figure 15 : The in and out degree distributions of the NNG for various settings of the α parameter.
Appendix 8 -Heaviside step function approximation to the effective connection probability
The Heaviside step function with the step at
is a good approximation to the effective connection probability in Eq. (22) for δ ∈ [10 −6 , 10 −3 ] and R = [12, 18] . With this step-function approximation, node u connects to v iff d uv ≤ R . Therefore the expected degree of u is the expected number of points lying within the intersection of the R−disk and the u-centred disk of radius R . To see that this step function is indeed a good approximation to the effective connection probability in the NNG equilibrium, recall that the area of the two disks above can be approximated as
From these one can obtain
If R from (47) is substituted into the formula above we get back the expected out-degree in (26) .
In particular, if R = R (as in [55] ), then
24 which coincides with Eqs. (12, 13) in [55] .
Appendix 9 -Clustering
Here we analyse local clustering using the effective connection probability (22) . By means of quasi-symbolic calculations we also show that local clustering depends on the expected node degree k similarly for both lower and upper bounds of the effective connection probability, and that average clustering does not depend on average degreek.
Let the hyperbolic polar coordinates of the point triplet u, v, w be (
The local clustering coefficient cl(r u ) for a given node u is calculated as the ratio of the expected number of link pairs with common edge u and the expected number of link triangles with edge u. For calculating these expected numbers, the joint probabilities of the existence of (u, v) and (u, w) link pair and the existence of the (u, v, w) link triangle are substituted by p(d uv )p(d uw ) and p(d uv )p(d uw )p(d vw ), respectively. This requires link independence assumption, which is not true, however, correlations are expectedly diminished due to averaging processes (like in mean field calculations [56] ). In this way, the local clustering coefficient is formulated as
For estimating these integrals in the numerator and the denominator the following functions are defined: 
where the general connection probability formula (22) , the approximation e 
Now we apply asymptotic expansions 3 of Nu(x, y, z) and De(x, y) in order to approximate them. Note that De(x, y) is simply the product of two integrals which reads as 
due to that I(0, x)-S(0, x) ≈ 2 π x −1 based on its asymptotic expansion [52] . For approximating Nu(x, y, z) we use Laplace's [57] method to generate first orders of the asymptotic expansion with respect to x, y and z. For this we take the first order Taylor series expansion of the sinus functions around 0 and 2π where the integral is dominant for larger x, y, z. Performing the double integral (53) with these series and erasing the exponentially small terms, we get the following four terms with respect to that x is in the neighbourhood of 0 or 2π and y is in the neighbourhood of 0 or 2π :
Now the clustering coefficient can be written as
Based on this it can be seen that cl(r u ) does NOT depend on the density parameter δ, and depends on the average degreek only through r u (k,k) (see equation (26) ) because all the x, y, z terms contain a 8 k δ factor. In this way both integrals in the numerator and denominator posses a 1 δ 2 factor. 4 In what follows we explore how the local clustering coefficient of a node is depending on the expected degree k. This is possible to perform through the inverse function ofk(r u ) (based on (26) ) which is r u (k) = R − 2 ln 2k/k . First the denominator is calculated which is possible in a parametric way.
with the substitutions x, y in (55) and r u (k) above. 5 Note that this is a good cross-validation of this formula, because the expected number of link pairs of a node with given expected degree k is approximately k(k − 1)/2 ≈ k 2 /2. 6 Based on the equations (58), (59) and substituting x, y, z into the formula of the integrand one can obtain cl(k,k, R) ≈ dr v dr w .
This double integral on the right hand side can be assessed symbolically by substitution, but even a simplified result is still quite spacious (see the next note). Nevertheless, the detailed analysis of 4 Note, that both the numerator and denominator are independent from δ. 5 Note that 16 xy does not depend onk due to the x, y and ru(k) substitution. 6 If the node degree κ has Poisson distribution with parameter k then the expected number of link pairs at this node is E κ(κ−1) 2 = ∞ l=0 l(l−1) 2 k l l! e −l , which is exactly k 2 2 . this function reveals that it is approximately independent of R, and as k is increasing, the local clustering coefficient tends to cl(k,k) ≈ ln(2)kk −1 .
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For simplicity and for catching the behaviour of cl(k,k) even for smaller k values, the following intuitive 7 form of approximation is calculated by numerical matching: where the coefficient a, b, c, d are approximately independent of R and is depending only onk. The coefficient is summarised in the following table for three cases: for the lower bound of the average degree 1, for the upper bound 4, andk = 2.27 which latter average degree comes from the numerical simulation of the network formation game.
Note that, for larger k's
and a d is very close to ln(2)k for all the three cases, as expected. It is now possible to compute average clustering based on the approximation above as 
Evaluating this integral for the average degree lower boundk = 1, upper boundk = 4, and the average degree in simulationsk = 2.27, we obtain, using Table 1 , cl = 0.447075, 0.447615, 0.447146, respectively. We have also performed more extensive numerical experiments showing that average clustering does not significantly depend on the average degree for δ ∈ [10 −8 , 10 −2 ] and R ∈ [10, 20] . Its dependence on R is also negligible, which is not surprising since R appears only on the upper limit of the integral, and this upper limit negligibly affects the result since the integrands decrease as ∼ k −5 . All these analytic and numeric results are in a good agreement with simulations, see 
where the function Li 2 (z) = ∞ k=1 z k k 2 is the di-logarithm special function. We observe that factors Exp(−R/2) and Exp(R/2) appear in several terms. If R is sufficiently large, e.g., ranging between realistic values of 10 and 20, then we can neglect the exponentially smaller terms, keeping only the exponentially large dominating terms. For example, k − 2ke − R 2 2k +k ≈k 2k +k and e R/2 (2k +k) ke R/2 − 2k ≈ 2k +k k .
Using this procedure, after some simplifications, we finally obtain an R−free expression for clustering:
cl(k,k) ≈ 1 8k 2k 8k ln (2) We can now see that cl(k,k) → ln(2)k k −1 as k increases, because the logarithmic terms become zero, while the dilogarithmic terms eliminate each other. The analysis of this function at k = 0 also shows that cl(0,k) = 1, from which it follows that b = 1 in the polynomial matching the numerical calculations, cf. Table 1 .
